China makes more electricity than America and Europe combined. What does that tell us?

What happened

What happened (fact)

On 25 October Gromen, founder of research firm FFTT, replied on X to a widely shared post by Mario Nawfal. The post, crediting the Financial Times and Oxford Economics, said China is no longer expected to overtake US nominal GDP soon: about 67% of America’s in 2025 and about 84% by 2040. We could not trace those figures.

His reply carried an Our World in Data chart ending in 2024. It holds up: China generated 10,087 TWh that year, against 7,164 TWh for the US and EU together. In 2025 it was 10,583 TWh against 7,317 TWh, about 1.45 times as much (our arithmetic). The International Energy Agency’s preliminary 2025 net-demand figures give about 1.43.

These are national totals; with China’s far larger population, per-person figures would look different.

Is electricity a good yardstick?

What Luke Gromen thinks (his view)

Gromen calls electricity production “arguably the single best measure of real economic output”, partly because electricity “cannot be stored efficiently at scale”. In one post he says it “correlates nearly perfectly” with real living standards and industrial production; in another, three minutes later, “extremely well”.

He discloses that he has “a significant investment in US electrical infrastructure”.

What happened (fact)

For rich economies the record is mixed. Reporting record US generation of about 4,430 TWh in 2025, up 2.8%, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) wrote: “This growth contrasts with the trend of relatively flat electricity generation between the mid-2000s and early 2020s.” Over roughly that span, 2005 to 2022, US real GDP rose about 38% (BEA, via FRED; our arithmetic). The EIA data roughly fit Gromen’s line that US output is “rising again after 20 years”.

The war-spending argument

What Luke Gromen thinks (his view)

In a separate post that afternoon, Gromen argued that GDP counts war spending as growth even when it leaves a lasting cost. He cited “$10 trillion in wars in Afghan & Iraq” and a yearly veterans’ bill of about $400bn, which he put at 8% of US receipts. In a reply that evening, he set this against infrastructure, where “the bridges will still be there”.

What happened (fact)

We found no public source for $10 trillion. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates about $8 trillion from late 2001 through FY2022. That covers the post-9/11 wars, including and beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, plus homeland-security counterterrorism spending. It includes a minimum of $2.2 trillion for veterans’ care obligations “through the next several decades” and excludes future interest (page updated June 2025).

His veterans’ figure is close. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spent $415.6bn in FY2026, 7.7% of $5,403bn in federal receipts (Treasury; our arithmetic), covering veterans of all eras.

His accounting point is partly right. GDP counts defence purchases and services such as VA health care as they happen. But VA cash benefits, such as disability pay, are transfer payments: they aren’t counted in GDP themselves, though what recipients buy with them is (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).

How fast is the VA bill growing? One post says “3x” receipts, a later one “2.5x”; neither gives a period, and the years chosen matter. In FY2026 alone VA spending rose 10.4% and receipts 3.2%, about 3.2 times as fast. Over five years (FY2021–FY2026) it is about 2.0 times, and over ten (FY2016–FY2026) about 1.8, on average annual growth (Treasury; our arithmetic). FY2016 included an extra month of benefits paid early; starting from FY2015 gives about 1.9.

What to watch next

• Around Thursday 12 November 2026Treasury’s first fiscal-2027 monthly figures (October): is VA spending still outpacing receipts?
• Around February 2027the IEA’s Electricity 2027, updating its preliminary 2025 figures.
• Usually April (2027)Ember’s next Global Electricity Review, with 2026 data.
• Any timea possible Costs of War update (last: June 2025).